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“The whole course of our policy of non-intervention – which has effectively, as we know,  
worked in an entirely one-sided manner – has been putting a premium on Franco´s victory” 
 
Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Office 
PRO FO371724115, W973, memo by Sir Robert Vansittart, 16 January 1939 
 
1. Introduction 
The humanitarian carnage of the Spanish Civil War, which left 500,000 to 600,000 dead, 
300,000 to 500,000 exiled,1 and hundreds of thousands more suffering repression in jails 
and forced labour,2 did not take place in an international legal vacuum. Far from it, we 
remember the Spanish Civil War as a “tertium genus”3 in the history of the relationship 
between international law and civil strife on account of an “anomalous”4 international 
legal innovation: a collective non-intervention pact. This spawned a series of technical 
debates between those who underwrote its “international legality” and those who 
denounced it as a “legal monstrosity” that fatally impaired the right of a democratically 
elected government to respond to a military putsch. The secular and democratic Spanish 
Constitution of 19315 was the first of the many victims of a non-intervention agreement 
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1 See e.g. Henry Kamen, The Disinherited. Exile and the Making of Spanish Culture (1492–1975), Harper 
Collins, New York (2007). 
2 See Paul Preston, The politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain, Routledge, 
London (1990)  
3 Antonio Cassesse, “The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal 
Armed Conflicts” in Cassese, A. (ed.) Current Problems of International Law. Essays on U.N. Law and on the 
Law of Armed Conflict. Dott.A. Giuffrè editore, Milano (1975) 
4 See, among others, e.g. Herbert A. Smith “Some Problems of the Spanish Civil War” British Yearbook 
International Law 18 (1937) 17-31  
5 See e.g. Manley O. Hudson “The Spanish Constitution of 1931” 26 American Journal of International Law 
3 (1932) pp. 579-582. See also Yolanda Gamarra, “Los lenguajes del Derecho internacional en la 
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that proved ineffectual in preventing a massively deleterious foreign military intervention 
in a beleaguered Spain between 1936 and 1939. The Republican Constitution was fully 
aligned to the spirit of pacifism and legal internationalism of the League of Nations.6 Its 
demise was followed by several decades of intellectual involution to an imagery of anti-
liberal, nationalist7 and ultra-Catholic references in Spanish political and cultural life and, 
by extension, in Spanish international legal thought.8  
 
Recent years have witnessed a new peak in scholarly attention to the legal-political 
evolution of the almost 40-year-long dictatorial regime of General Franco and of the 
Spanish Civil War.9 This new wave of historical research10 has been partly elicited by Judge 
B. Garzón’s11 attempt to bring to bear the imprescriptibility of “crimes against 
humanity”12 against the letter of the pre-constitutional 1977 Amnesty Law.13 In the wake 
                                                          
Constitucion de 1931” in Gamarra, Y. & De la Rasilla, I. (eds.) Historia del pensamiento internacionalista 
espanol del siglo XX, Thompson Reuters Aranzadi, Madrid (2012) Article 6 of the Spanish Republican 
Constitution of 1931 stated in the wake of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Spain’s “renunciation to war as an 
instrument of national policy”, and art. 7 established that “The Spanish state will obey the universal normal 
of international law incorporating them into its positive law”. 
6  Article 77 of the Spanish Constitution of 1931 went “so far as to prohibit the President from signing a 
declaration of war "except subject to the conditions prescribed in the Covenant of the League of Nations" 
and after the exhaustion of all peaceful means of procedure”, See  Francis O. Wilcox, “The League of Nations  
and the Spanish Civil War”, 198 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,  (1938), 
pp. 65-72  at 65 
7 See Agustin José Menendez, “From Republicanism to Fascist Ideology under the Early Franquismo” in 
Joerges, Christian and Ghaleigh, Navraj Singh (eds.), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of 
National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions, Hart Publishers, Oxford (2003) 337–
360. 
8 See Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “The Fascist Mimesis of Spanish International Law and its Vitorian 
Aftermath, 1939-1953”, The Journal of the History of International Law 14 (2012) 207-236 
9 This was once known by liberals and those on the Left as the “last great cause”. A term popularized by 
Stanley Weintraub, The Last Great Cause. The Intellectuals and the Spanish Civil War,  Weybright and Yalley, 
New York (1968) 
10  See Julian  Casanova, “Pasado y presente de la Guerra civil española”, Historia Social  60 (2008) 113-127. 
11 Baltazar Garzón, an early champion of universal jurisdiction, was accused of gross judicial misconduct in 
his application of the Historical Memory, See Decision (Auto) of 16 October 2008.   
12 The Spanish 1977 Amnesty Law, which sealed off the reconciliation of “las dos Españas” (“the two 
Spains”) from the haunting spectre of a past that lingered heavily freighted with emotional and political 
baggage after Franco’s death, prevented, however, Spanish courts for investigating “mass killings and mass 
illegal detentions with disappearance” committed in the context of a systematic attack against civilians, 
which occurred in Spain between 17 July 1936 and 31 December 1951. See Ley 52/2007, de 26 de 
diciembre, por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes 
padecieron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura. BOE-A-2007-22296. The Spanish 
Historical Memory Act has contributed to refashion the Spanish case as one of “late transitional justice”. 
Josep M. Tamarit Sumallla, Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain. A Case of Late Transitional 
Justice, Intersentia, Cambridge (2013) 
13  See Tamarit Sumalla, op.cit. 118-123.  
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of the historical Memory Act of late 2007, monumental volumes of new research have 
detailed the magnitude of what P. Preston baptized ”the Spanish Holocaust.”14 Despite 
the importance of the Spanish Civil War in the history and legal memory of Spain, and as 
a dress rehearsal for the horrors of the Second World War, historians of international law 
remain latecomers to its study.15  This dearth of attention16 is even more paradoxical 
given that the Spanish Civil War marked the death knell of the system of international 
relations born with the Peace of Versailles. Despite the time that has elapsed since 
Franco’s last war dispatch, the numerous international legal facets of this “European civil 
war in miniature”17 may still provide insights for the international legal analysis of modern 
civil wars. While brief scattered references to the multiplicity of issues raised by the 
Spanish Civil War can be found in most disparate areas of international law, scholarship 
still tends to neglect the fact that that it “abounded in anomalous situations”.18  
 
The fundamental international legal event which sealed the dismal fate of the Second 
Spanish Republic and led to a variety of “anomalous” international legal situations took 
place at the very outset of the Spanish Civil War. Aware of the logistical support Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy had provided the anti-Republican forces with, in the summer 
of 1936 the British and French governments decided to champion a collective 
international non-intervention agreement. The key questions that arise from the Spanish 
Civil War concern the legality of such an international non-intervention agreement and 
                                                          
14  Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain, Harper 
Press, London (2012). 
15 See, in English, as one of the few substantial exceptions among international lawyers in the last twenty 
years, Nathaniel Berman “Between "Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism” 
26 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics. 449 (1993-1994). For an earlier substantial 
analysis, Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. “International legal Aspects of the Civil War in Spain, 
1936-39” in R Falk (ed.) The International Law of Civil War (1971) 111-178 
16 Berman points to the fact that “the legal historiography of the Spanish Civil War, perhaps even more than 
that of the League as a whole, has suffered due to the fact that the war and the international response to 
it came to be seen as merely the opening act of World War II”. Berman op.cit.  485.  One would add that 
the lack of serious historical work by Spanish international lawyers themselves might have much to do with 
the fact that, not just the Spanish Civil War, but also the study of the history of international law in Spain 
during the 19th and 20th centuries still remains almost in its infancy. See e.g. Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral 
,"Beyond the Spanish Classics - The Ephemeral Awakening of the History of International Law in Pre-
Democratic Spain", 7 Monde(s) Histoires, Relations(2015) pp. 137-157 
17 Enrique Moradiellos, “El acuerdo inalcanzable: las potencias democráticas occidentales y la Unión 
Soviética ante la Guerra civil Española” S. Balfour & P. Preston, España y las grandes potencias en el siglo 
XX, Editorial Crítica, Barcelona (2002) 70-97, at 70. 
18 See Lawrence Preuss “State Immunity and the Requisition of Ships during the Spanish Civil War: I. Before 
the British Courts” The American Journal of International Law, 35. 2 (1941), 263-281, 281 
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its accompanying arms embargo.19 The state of customary international law and treaty 
law regarding the duties of third states on the occurrence of civil wars justified the 
expectation of the Spanish government that it could maintain its commercial relations 
unchanged. The international doctrine of recognition of belligerency was also affected by 
the establishment of the anomalous pact of “de facto” collective neutrality that cunningly 
neutralized the League´s system of collective security. Nevertheless, the non-intervention 
agreement, which aimed to localise the Spanish Civil War, triggered other related 
international legal problems that caused much ink to flow. These included the uncertain 
international legal effects of de iure and/or de facto recognition by third states of the 
insurgent government – a question which had repercussions for matters of jurisdictional 
immunity arising before the courts of third states.  Meanwhile, Britain had domestic legal 
deterrents designed to prevent national volunteers from enlisting in foreign civil conflicts 
– an issue that still evokes contemporary controversies between neutral official policies 
and acts of transnational solidarity in foreign civil strife.20  
 
The Spanish Civil War is the 20th century event which is most often cited as having single-
handedly prompted more historical research. However, the study of the particular 
contribution of interwar British international lawyers to the Spanish Civil War remains a 
neglected area of study for historians and international lawyers alike.21 This is perplexing, 
given that the exact concordance of the Realpolitik concerns of the British Foreign Office 
                                                          
19 See e.g. Normal P. Padeldorf, “The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War” 
American Journal of International Law  31 (1937) 578-603 
20 . The object of this study is to throw further light on the role interwar British international lawyers played 
in the debates surrounding to the Spanish civil War. Beyond the scope of this work are left a number of 
other aspects of possible historical international legal interest emerged from the Spanish Civil War which 
are common to other civil wars. For an analysis of a number of other issues including e.g. the study of the 
means of diplomatic dispute settlement that were attempted in order to end the conflict; the international 
legal regime that was applied to asylum seekers and refugees or concern; the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law by then in vigour were applied or what peace-keeping role specialized 
organisms such as the international Red Cross played in the conflict: or, after the war, what legal regime 
was applied to the government in exile, what treatment did the United Nations retrospectively apply to the 
Spanish Civil War or to what developments of the international legal order – such as, for instance, 
reparations for crimes against humanity or responsibility for historical violations of human rights by foreign 
intervening powers -  may the Spanish civil war be seen to have contributed se e.g. in Spanish, but only very 
recently, Carlos Fernandez Liesa, La Guerra civil española y el orden jurídico internacional,  Thompson 
Reuters Aranzadi, Madrid, (2014)   
21 New research in the history of international law may, indeed, benefit from taking S. Neff’s remark 
seriously: “The role of international lawyers in the various wars of history is another of the many subjects 
that still awaits a detailed treatment”. See Stephen Neff, Justice Among Nations. A History of International 
Law, Harvard University Press, (2014) 339.  
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and the strategic goals of the Franco nationalist camp still puzzles historians.22 Much has 
slipped unnoticed by international law historians as a result of a “tendency to view the 
official British response to the contending sides in the civil war as almost exclusively 
determined by a semi-disinterested diplomatic balancing act designed to protect the 
fragile peace”.23 However, it is historically untenable to identify the single dominant 
factor behind the British-led policy of localization of the Spanish Civil War as being the 
preservation of European peace against the danger of escalation of the Spanish Civil War 
into a full-scale European war. Instead, contemporary historians tend to agree with S. P. 
Mackenzie that “the long-suspected true nature of Britain's non-intervention policy has 
been confirmed in the detailed studies that have emerged since the relevant government 
files were first opened in the 1970s”.24  Many international lawyers, in their turn, have 
not hesitated to describe this early milestone in the British policy of appeasement against 
the irredentism of fascist powers as one that “insofar as traditional international law is 
concerned was a bastard thing with Alice in Wonderland overtones”.25  
 
The first section of this study examines the establishment of the international non-
intervention agreement and of the London Committee and their combined neutralizing 
effect on the League of Nations in the light of a series of underlying factors, including the 
European powers´ leaning towards neutrality in the late interwar period. The second 
section reviews the core issues and different doctrinal positions present in the 
international legal debates triggered by the Spanish Civil War. It pays particular attention 
to the contributions of the first two British judges at the International Court of Justice, A. 
D. McNair (1946-1955) and H. Lauterpacht (1955-1960) to these debates. Their writings 
can be seen as respectively representative of the two stages through which British 
international lawyers went in the international legal debates on the Spanish Civil War. Up 
                                                          
22 See e.g. Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1997). 
23 Helen Graham, “Spain and Europe: the View from the Periphery” The Historical Journal, (1992) 969-983, 
971. According to this social historian, this traditional tendency was a consequence of the legacy of 
“Western cold war ideology” which had “the capacity to impair historical understanding because it presents 
social realities as if they were static phenomena - to be read backwards in the light of the political status 
quo”. Ibid., 978   
24 S P. Mackenzie, “The Foreign Enlistment Act and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Twentieth Century 
British History 10 (1999) 52-66, 53 
25 A Van Wynen Thomas and A J Thomas, Jr., “Non Intervention and the Spanish Civil War” American Society 
of International Law Proceedings (1967), 1-6, 5.  
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to early 1938, British International lawyers adopted a characteristically apologetic 
approach to the policy undertaken by the British Government on the advice of the British 
Foreign Office. The second stage, from early 1938 to the end of the Spanish Civil War in 
March 1939, was in turn informed by a “practitioner´s approach” to the analysis of the 
domestic cases brought before the British courts as a result of the hostilities. The article 
concludes with a brief analysis of the case for British “benevolent neutrality to the 
Nationalists”26 in the Spanish Civil War, reviewing the underlying motives which historians 
have highlighted as lurking behind the British-led non-intervention policy in the Spanish 
Civil War. 
 
1 Setting the Stage for the Localization of the Spanish Civil War and the Turn to 
Neutrality 
 
 
For almost 40 years, the Spanish Phalange’s propaganda celebrated July 18th 1936 as the 
day of the “glorioso alzamiento nacional” (“glorious national uprising”). On that day, 
Francisco Franco, the youngest European general of his day, who had already 
distinguished himself as a bold and cold-blooded officer in the Spanish colonial campaigns 
in North Africa,27 joined a military uprising against the Second Spanish Republic. On 15th 
August 1936, less than a month after Franco launched his anti-Republican “national 
crusade in defence of the Western Christian civilization and against Communist 
barbarism”, Britain and France instituted with an exchange of notes an international 
agreement of non-intervention in Spain.28 The French Front Populaire government, led 
by Leon Blum, had responded favourably to the Spanish Republic´s requests for 
importation of war material on 21st July, but it provisionally halted exports on 27th July.29  
The non-intervention agreement of 15th August 1936 enshrined a French neutralist 
readjustment under the influence of both domestic political factors and British diplomatic 
                                                          
26 Enrique Moradiellos, Neutralidad benevola. Ed.Pentalfa, Oviedo (1990)  
27 On General Francisco Franco, see e.g.  P. Preston, Franco. A Bibliography, Harper Press, London (1995) 
28 See e.g. Fernando Schwartz, F., La internacionalización de la guerra civil española, Ariel, Barcelona (1971)  
29  The literature on the French “change of mind” is very extensive e.g. M. D. Gallagher, “Leon Blum and the 
Spanish Civil War” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1971), pp. 56-64.  
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pressure.30 It was a hard blow for the besieged Spanish Republic. Despite the logistical 
aid the insurgents had received from Hitler’s Germany on 26th July31 and Mussolini’s 
Italy32 soon afterwards, the military insurrection had fallen short of meeting its objectives. 
The Franco-British exchange of notes made “both countries’ declarations contingent 
upon the adherence of the other government plus the governments of Germany, Italy, 
the Soviet Union and Portugal”.33 Twenty-seven other governments soon jumped on the 
Anglo-French bandwagon and made similar declarations to those contained in the 
agreement’s preamble, whereby the original parties declared their resolution to “abstain 
rigorously from all interference“ (de toute ingérence, direct or indirect) in the internal 
affairs of Spain.34 The parties also subscribed to the agreement’s “three declarations of 
policy”, aiming at the immediate implementation of a collective embargo on the sale of 
weapons to Spain, which extended to contracts that were already in course of execution 
with the Republican government. Despite the vaunted use of the term “international 
agreement”, J. Edwards has recalled that “no agreement was legally binding on all”35 the 
state parties. Indeed, several state parties did not sign the preamble of the non-
intervention agreement and some of them appended interpretations, qualifications, or 
reservations to its provisions. In view of this, already back in 1937 N.P. Padelford 
remarked that the non-intervention agreement was “merely a concert of policy” whose 
“fulfilment depended entirely upon the initiative of each state”.36  
 
                                                          
30 See W.N. Medlicott and D. Dakin (Eds.) Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 Second Series 
Volume XVII, Western Pact Negotiations: Outbreak of Spanish Civil War June 1936 – January 1937 (1979) 
31 For a account see e.g. M. Jean-François Berdah, “L'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni face à la question 
espagnole: reconnaissance de facto ou reconnaisance de jure? (1936- 1939)” Mélanges de la Casa de 
Velázquez 29 (1993) 203-241.  See also extended historical archival references in Enrique Moradiellos, “El 
mundo ante el avispero espanol: intervencion y no intervencion extranjera en la Guerra Civil“ in Santos 
Julia (coord.) Republica y Guerra en Espana (1931-1939), Espasa Calpe, 2006,  pp. 305-310   
32 On the decisive role played by the early intervention of Germany, see e.g. Jose Luis Neila, Espana y el 
Mediterraneo en el siglo XX, Silex, Madrid (2011) 220. 
33 See Padeldorf, op.cit. 580. 
34 International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain , The 
Legislative and Other Measures Taken by the Participating Governments to Give Effect to the Agreement 
Regarding Non-intervention in Spain , and by the Swiss Government to Prohibit the Export of Arms and War 
Material from Switzerland to Spain, HM Stationery Office, London (1936) 
35 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, MacMillan Press, London (1979) 41 
36 See Padeldorf, op.cit. 580.  
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The Non-Intervention Committee, which was composed of diplomatic representatives of 
the non-intervening powers, was formed under the aegis of the British Foreign Office in 
London on 9th September 1936.  Approved on the 12th November 1936, the first control 
plan of the London Committee established a system to control the entry of weapons and 
war materials into Spain. It was extended in mid-January 1937 to cover recruitment in, 
transit through, and departure from the territory of the signatories of persons of non-
Spanish nationality intending to proceed to Spain for the purpose of taking part in the 
war. This supplementary measure was included at the request of the British government, 
which under a revived Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 had made it illegal to recruit or 
volunteer for the armed forces of either side upon liability “on conviction to 
imprisonment up to two years, or to a fine or to both a fine and imprisonment'.37 The 
second control plan of the London Committee was approved on 8th March and entered 
in force on 20th April 1937. This provided for control of the land borders and a maritime 
control with neutral observers posted to Spanish ports and borders and the assignation 
of patrol zones to the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. Its application led to 
grave maritime incidents and, eventually, to the withdrawal of Italy and Germany from 
the non-intervention agreement. Despite the Committee being seen as “a mutually 
consented institutionalized farce”38 throughout 1937, British diplomacy used its influence 
to convince both countries to return to it in order to safeguard the formal maintenance 
of the agreement. Indeed, the control plans had become toothless in terms of both 
policing and enforcement.39 New measures, such as the setting up of an observation 
scheme and a series of bodies and further measures to manage it, were added to them 
in late 1937.40 These measures were included in the “Nyon Agreement”41 signed off at a 
conference of Mediterranean and Black Sea states which had been convened to set up a 
system of vigilance of the commercial shipping routes in the Mediterranean Sea in order 
to minimize the effects of Italian submarine warfare.  
                                                          
37  See PRO, FO 371/21319, W906/7/41) Foreign Enlistment Act (1870), Bill (228) II. 61, Bill to Prevent 
Enlisting or Engagement of H.M. Subjects to Serve in Foreign Service, 1870)  
38 Moradiellos op.cit., 90 
39 Padeldorf, op.cit. 587 
40 Id., 591-592.  
41 Signatories were the countries of Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
the USSR and Yugoslavia.  A second Agreement was signed on 17 September 1937 in Geneva. It extended 
the rules governing submarine warfare to surface vessels, and had the same signatories  
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Between the creation of the London Committee and the end of the Spanish Civil War on 
1st April 1939, “[t]here would be 30 meetings of the plenary committee and 93 of the 
Chairman’s subcommittee, and seven further subcommittees dealt with technical 
problems as they arose”.42 However, the ineffectual character of the non-intervention 
system was obvious to its contemporaries.43 This has largely been corroborated by 
historical data, leaving no doubt as to the failure of the strategy of international 
“localization” of the long drawn-out Spanish Civil War.44 It is estimated that more than 
150,000 foreign troops, German and – especially – Italian Blackshirt militiamen served in 
the Rebel-Nationalist Army. Moreover, Germany and Italy supplied Franco’s camp with 
some 10,000 technicians, military officials for training camps and a total of $505 million 
worth of war materials. Franco’s crusade also benefited from the logistical and diplomatic 
support of Salazar´s Estado Novo.45 On the other hand, the Republican Army included 
50,000 foreign troops – 40,000 of which were in the “international brigades”, which 
comprised anti-fascist volunteers from over fifty countries,46 while an estimated 10,000 
volunteers fought directly with the Loyalist Army. Furthermore, the Soviet Union supplied 
up to 2000 technicians and $100 million worth of arms and weapons to the Spanish 
Republic. Comintern’s aid to the loyalists – mainly in the form of war materials – has been 
estimated at $200 million, while other foreign military aid received has been estimated 
at $50 million.47 This massive foreign intervention was possible despite the parallel 
application of domestic legal deterrents in “non-intervening” countries such as Britain. 
According to H. Graham, these included the “devastating efficacy of other initiatives 
instigated by the British which worked consistently and exclusively against the Republic, 
for example the effects of the merchant shipping act (carriage of munitions to Spain) 
passed in December 1936 (which made it illegal for British ships to carry war material 
from any port, including foreign ports, to any Spanish port – a trade which it was 
                                                          
42 Edwards, op.cit. 45 
43 D.Graham Hutton, “British Policy Towards Spain” Foreign Affairs 15 (1936-1937) 661. 
44 See among others e.g. Preston (2012), op.cit.  
45 See e.g. Jose C. Jiménez Redondo “La política del bloque ibérico: las relaciones hispano-portuguesas 
(1936-1949)” Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 29 (1993) 175-201. 
46  Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Penguin Books, London( 2nd ed., 1977) pp. 980-984 
47 See e.g. Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, “Non Intervention and the Spanish Civil War” American Society 
of International Law Proceedings (1967) 1, 2. 
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previously lawful for them to engage in), and the repeated blocking of the Republic's 
sterling export account by the British authorities”.48 In 1937, S. Baldwin´s conservative 
government revived the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 – a particular example of a domestic 
legal deterrent addressed at limiting the role of the many British activists who, even to 
the detriment of other parallel causes49 in China, were convinced that “for Europe 
Republicans Spain was both a front and a frontier”50 against the international rise of 
authoritarianism and fascism. The revival of the 1870 Act was an extension of the London 
Committee´s first control plan. This had been approved soon after the signature on 2 
January 1937, at the height of Italian intervention in Spain, of an Anglo-Italian 
Gentleman's Agreement by which Britain and Italy vowed to respect each other’s rights 
in the Mediterranean Sea. However, the re-enactment of the Foreign Enlistment Act 
proved to be relatively ineffective51 in deterring circa 2,500 volunteers and their 
associated medical units from fleeing the British Isles to serve in the International 
Brigades.52 The relative ineffectiveness of the Act, which became saddled with problems 
of legal applicability and enforcement, was related to the anomalous character of the 
international regime of non-intervention. From a legal perspective, the wording of the 
1870 Act required that “(a) Britain be at peace with both sides, and (b) that each 
contender be a de facto foreign state – defined as 'any foreign country, colony, province, 
or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to 
exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, or province or 
part of any province or people”.53 Thus, discussions arose as to whether the application 
of the 1870 Act was tantamount to a British formal recognition of Franco’s regime. 
Another related question which also created uncertainty within the British Foreign office 
was whether the “Act was applicable without a formal declaration of neutrality to 
                                                          
48 Graham, op.cit., 972  
49 See e.g. Tom Buchanan “Shanghai-
and China, 1936–39” Contemporary European History  21 (2012) 533 - 552 
50 Graham, op. cit. 971  
51 S. P. Mackenzie, “The Foreign Enlistment Act and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Twentieth Century 
British History 10 (1999) 52-66  
52 Bibliography is also extensive for the British volunteers, see e.g. James K. Hopkins, Into the Heart of the 
Fire: The British in the Spanish Civil War (Stanford University Press, Standfor 1998) and Richard Baxell, 
British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War: The British Battalion in the International Brigades, 1936–1939 
Routledge, London(2004).  
53 Mackenzie, op.cit. 65 
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establish clearly that Britain was 'at peace' with both sides”.54 Despite its relative 
ineffectiveness, the Foreign Enlistment Act, which remains a precedent for the 
disjuncture between official policies and acts of transnational solidarity in foreign civil 
strife, played an important symbolic function in the Spanish Civil War.  
 
The “localization” stance which many states adopted under British leadership in relation 
to the Spanish Civil War was undertaken outside the institutional framework of the 
League of Nations. Despite the support that Germany and Italy had provided Franco’s 
troops with, the Spanish Republic could have successfully fought Franco’s rebellion in 
September 1936. At this time the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alvarez del Vayo, 
addressed the Assembly of the League to denounce that the so-called non-intervention 
agreement instead amounted to foreign intervention in Spain:   
The legal monstrosity of the formula of non-intervention is manifest. That formula…places 
on the same footing the lawful Government of my country and the rebels, whom any 
Government worthy of the name is not only entitled but bound to suppress and punish. 
From the juridical point of view, non-intervention, as applied to Spain, represents an 
innovation in the traditional rules of international law, for it means withholding means of 
action from a lawful Government.55 
 
The Spanish government also claimed that the foreign aid provided to the coup d’état 
was incompatible with the “prescription of open, just and honourable relations between 
nations” included in the Preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations. However, 
on 24th September the League of Nations decided to declare its incompetence to deal 
with the Spanish Civil War under the pretext that it lacked competence on questions of 
internal order. To its declaration of incompetence, the League added delegation for the 
management of the Spanish conflict to the London Committee, which it categorized as a 
sort of specialized agency.56 Desperate claims to the League of Nations by the Spanish 
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Republic’s government, which was excluded from participation in the London Committee, 
continued after Italy and Germany recognised General Franco’s government as the de 
iure government of Spain on 18th November 1936. This recognition took place barely a 
few days before Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact – the cradle of the 
Second World War’s Axis Powers, which Italy joined on 6th November 1937.  On 27th 
November 1936, the Republican government “appealed to the Council to consider the 
’armed intervention‘ of Germany and Italy in Spain and the circumstances threatening to 
disturb international peace under the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant”.57 
International lawyers such as Philip C. Jessup did not hesitate to term it an “illegal 
intervention” 58 and even British international lawyers such A.D. McNair deemed it “an 
act of war against Spain.”59 However, on 12th December the Council adopted a resolution 
that did not condemn the action of any state and once again gave moral support to the 
non-intervention plan by referring the matter to the London committee.  Throughout 
1937 and 1938, the status quo remained unchanged. With the documental support of a 
White Book containing 101 original documents, the Spanish government denounced the 
massive Italian intervention on the basis of Articles 10 and 16 as a case of “external 
aggression against … [its] territorial integrity and existing political independence” in 
September 1937. However, once again, “the Council merely applauded the work of the 
Non-Intervention Committee, approved the international supervision of Spain, and urged 
the speedy withdrawal of volunteers”.60 The League again examined the Spanish case in 
May and September 1938 but “its resolutions went largely unheeded”.61  
 
Manuel Azaña, the President of the Second Spanish Republic, summarized the position 
of the Spanish government in a speech delivered in the summer of 1937. According to 
Azaña, the London Committee “is not established in the arena of international law, in the 
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Review 53 (1937) 471 – 500, 497 
60 See  Francis O. Wilcox, “The League of Nations  and the Spanish Civil War”, 198 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science,  (1938), pp. 65-72  at 68 
61  De Zayas, op.cit. 
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “In the General Interest of Peace “- British International Lawyers and the Spanish 
Civil War 17 Journal of the History of International Law (2015, Forthcoming) © 
13 
 
juridical arena, but in the political and governmental one” 62 and it thus “examines the 
Spanish conflict not in the light of law and of international treaties, but as a factual 
question”. 63 Consequently, Azaña concluded that the London Committee “does not 
replace the League of Nations but only narcotizes it”.64 Indeed, the Spanish Civil War 
sounded the death knell of the system of collective security established by the Versailles’ 
Treaty. Retracing the non-intervention agreement back to a previous turn towards 
’neutrality‘ among the European democratic powers can help us explain the rapid 
acceptance of the status quo regarding the Spanish Civil War. The path towards neutrality 
had been paved by a series of symbolic events throughout the 1930s.65 These included 
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the abandonment of the League of 
Nations by Nazi Germany, which was accompanied by the parallel introduction of an 
intense programme of rearmament in 1933. The Abyssinian Crisis in 1935-36 and the 
British and French military passivity in March 1936 in the face of Hitler’s remilitarization 
of the Rhineland in breach of the Versailles Treaty were subsequent milestones in the 
slow crumbling of the interwar system, despite some successes such as the imposition of 
sanctions against Italy. The “unfulfilled promise of the League” in the area of collective 
security along with the policy of appeasement adopted by the British and French entente 
of satisfying Italo-German pretensions “without engendering vital British interests”66 
triggered, moreover, a “tendency for states” such as Belgium and Switzerland and other 
small democracies “that had previously been neutral to reassert that status”.67  
 
This turn to neutrality took place against the background of the rise of what K. 
Loewenstein in 1937 termed a “Fascist International in the making”, understood as “a 
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closer transnational alignment or bloc of fascist nations”.68 This Fascist International was 
“transcending national borders and cutting across historical diversities of traditionally 
disjointed nationalisms”69 and supported a “pattern of a specific technique of fascist 
penetration and conquest”70 throughout the European continent. The turn to neutrality 
also engulfed the foreign policy of the Second Spanish Republic – a middle democratic 
power – during the years preceding the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish Republican foreign 
policy was originally founded on the post-1931 revolutionary democratic conviction that 
Spanish national interests entailed making the core of Spanish foreign policy “nothing 
other than an outward projection of the democratic principles that inspired domestic 
policy”.71 From this followed a Republican alignment with the principles of the League of 
Nations, which “was perceived as the equivalent on the international level of what the 
Republic represented on the domestic level”.72 This position, which was enshrined in The 
Spanish Constitution of 1931,73 was also embodied by the man who represented Spain in 
Geneva for most of this period, Salvador de Madariaga (1886-1978), whom John Simon, 
the chief British delegate to the Council of the League, used to call “half ironically, half 
seriously, the conscience of the League of Nations.”74 A practical example of this policy 
was Spain’s leadership in The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 
between 1932 and 1934. However, although Republican “Spain had been among the 
League's firmest supporters”,75 the Spanish general election of 1934 opened a two-year 
period of the political spectrum in Spain swinging to the right. The heightening of 
domestic tensions, which was illustrated by the severe repression suffered by the 
Asturian miners’ uprising in 1934, and the international climate brought about by the 
eruption of the Abyssinian crisis, led Spanish foreign policy to lean towards neutrality. 
This policy of renewed isolationism and neutrality in the application of a generalized 
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policy of cautious appeasement of the irredentist and hegemonic policies of European 
totalitarian regimes once again became more inclusively geared within the framework of 
the League after the election of the Popular Front government in February 1936. 
However, this late realignment could not prevent the Second Spanish Republic from 
being the “first European victim” of the turn to neutrality.76 This drift toward neutrality 
provides the context for the quick subscription by many European powers to the 
“international non-intervention agreement” in the Spanish Civil War under the leadership 
of Britain and France. Authors like N. Berman have attempted to discover the intellectual 
sources of this drive towards neutrality by identifying a series of “theoretical precursors 
of the justifiers of the "non-intervention" system” in the writings of interwar international 
lawyers. The existence of these precursors suggests to Berman that the non-intervention 
“system cannot be simply dismissed as part of the general political collapse of the 
Versailles system.”77 Rather, he argues, despite “the utter hypocrisy and cynicism with 
which it (the non-intervention system) was implemented at the time,”78 it emerged “in 
the context of a series of reform proposals”79 of the system of collective security. It is true 
that debates over the need to reform the League in the light of the eruption of conflicts 
and the ineffectiveness of sanctions were held in 1936 within the framework of the 
League itself.80 However, the quick acceptance of the non-intervention agreement 
outside the framework of the League of Nations suggests looking elsewhere. 
 A British geo-strategic concern over the existing balance in the Mediterranean was 
behind the non-intervention policy and the gradual crumbling of the League´s system of 
collective security. The anti-Republican uprising took place barely a month after Britain 
had decided to unilaterally urge the abandonment of sanctions against Italy over 
Abyssinia.81 The Western Mediterranean had a long history of heightening tensions 
among European imperial powers. The Algeciras conference of 190682 and the crisis of 
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Agadir during the second Moroccan crisis83 of 1911 were recent proofs of this. Britain 
chose a strategy of rapprochement and conciliation toward Italy, which, as we shall see, 
continued throughout the Spanish Civil War.84Novel social aspects of the war also played 
a critical role in fostering the non-intervention agreement at a time when new 
transnational social factors began to inform new perspectives on intervention. C.G. 
Fenwick, writing for the American Journal of International Law in 1938, approached the 
question of whether civil wars could be brought under the control of international law, 
and remarked: 
[What] we have been witnessing in Spain for the last two years is in a broad way a 
reversal of the earlier revolt of liberalism against monarchical legitimacy. For this 
time it is the conservative groups that are the rebels; it is the army and the 
propertied interests that are questioning the authority of the de iure government; 
and in their challenge to the constitutional regime they are receiving the support 
of the clerics, who have normally been on the side of the established order.85 
Fenwick was also aware that answers to foreign intervention in domestic conflicts had 
ebbed and flowed since the principle of legitimacy had supported foreign intervention on 
behalf of absolute monarchs against liberal revolts86 in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
Empire. He hinted at a sort of international federal solution against the background of 
the “failure of international law to develop any general rule expressing the right of the 
community of nations to intervene between the parties to a civil war”87 and the 
consequent “assertion on the part of individual states of a right to take the law into their 
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own hands” 88  throughout the long nineteenth century. Fenwick was aware that although 
“the method by which the United States has met the problem within the scope of its 
federal constitution”89 was suggestive in domestic terms, it was not “sufficiently parallel 
to the international problem to permit inferences to be drawn from it.”90 Although the 
letter of the non-intervention agreement cannot in itself be seen as an indication of the 
emergence of a perception according to which intervention on the side of the legitimate 
government 91was permissible in civil wars, it may, however, perhaps, be seen as an 
occasion that triggered intellectual reflections in this respect.92 
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that the Republican government did not formally request military intervention by a foreign power in Spain, 
it might be tempting to try to retrospectively – that is, after the horrors of the Second World War – identify 
the abject failure of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war as the starting point for a change of 
perspective regarding the legality of intervention upon invitation of a lawful government. However, the 
letter of the non-intervention agreement in the Spanish Civil War seems a wrong starting point. Although 
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Also inherently linked to the historical causes behind the British decision to foster the 
quick alignment of neutral attitudes towards the Spanish Civil War was the fear of 
Bolshevism. In 1937, Loewenstein also lucidly analysed how “the hatred of communism 
and its kin, Marxism and socialism” was essential among “the programmatic and 
ideological ingredients of the widely ramified movement of international fascism”.93 
Moreover, in Spain, anti-communism allied itself with a religious fervour which borrowed 
from the crusade-like ultra-Catholic credentials of the Spanish imperial Christianising and 
Counter-Reformation past.  The portrayal of Franco as the “sentinel of Western 
civilization” was supported by a number of Spanish international lawyers, who went as 
far as to argumentatively justify Franco’s “glorious national uprising” with reference to 
the works of the so-called Spanish founders of international law94 and the Spanish 
Seconda Scholastica. The status in international circles of Francisco de Vitoria had risen 
exponentially, partly due to championing of him in the early 1930s by J. Brown Scott, a 
founder of the American Society of International law.95 Supporters of Franco´s coup 
d’état included noted Spanish international lawyers such as J. Yanguas Messia , the co-
founder of the Association Francisco de Vitoria in 1926,96who drafted the Junta decree 
of 29 September 1936 that proclaimed General Franco chief of the government of the 
Spanish State. Another reputed Spanish international lawyer, J. M. Trias de Bes, who was 
also an active supporter of the Association Francisco de Vitoria, was a member of the 
committee of 22 jurists who drafted the “Advisory Opinion on the Illegitimacy of the 
Acting Powers on the 18th of July 1936”.97 The vaunted ultra-Catholic and anti-communist 
credentials of the nationalists arguable played a role in F.D. Rooselvelt’s decision to follow 
the British lead against the letter of its own traditional policy of aiding a legally recognised 
democratic government. However, as we shall see, the legal impossibility encountered 
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by the US State Department of enforcing its “moral embargo”98 against private domestic 
parties forced the US Congress to enact an Amended Neutrality Act in May 1937. 
3. International Legal Aspects of the Spanish Civil War 
International lawyers have traditionally understood the "non-intervention" system in the 
Spanish Civil War in terms of “its conformity with, or divergence from, the traditional 
rules”99 regulating intervention in foreign wars at the time. A number of contemporary 
authors considered the non-intervention system to greatly diverge from traditional rules 
and criticized it as a mask for intervention. A second group supported the position that 
the "non-intervention" system was in “conformity with the traditional rules” regulating 
intervention in foreign wars, but highlighted its sui generis character.100 Recognition of 
the anomalous character of the non-intervention pact was pervasive in all cases. British 
international lawyers in particular were, as we shall see, at pains to fit the non-
intervention policy into traditional categories of international law. Their analysis of the 
international legal aspects raised by the Spanish Civil War can be divided into two main 
stages. Between 1937 and early 1938, they mainly focused their attention on the legal 
justification of the policy of non-intervention and the management of its anomalous 
international legal framework. From early 1938 to the end of the Spanish Civil War, 
analysis by the British courts of cases arising from the conflict came to the fore. The 
apologetic stage aimed to tame the anomalies of the course of action adopted by the 
British Conservative government into technically debatable international legal categories; 
the second stage was presided over by a “practitioner’s approach”.  
Many international lawyers agreed with the Spanish government that non-intervention 
was simply a mask for intervention on Franco’s side. They concurred that the Spanish 
Republic’s characterization of it as a “legal monstrosity” was a fair portrayal of the non-
intervention agreement. By depriving the lawful (and democratically legitimate) 
government of Spain of its customary entitlements under international law, the non-
intervention agreement forced the Republic “to seek arms in the murky world of the 
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private market”101 at astronomical prices. For Georges Scelle, who decried the inaction 
of the League of Nations, the non-intervention system meant the illegal withholding from 
a member State of the League of Nations of the "free and complete exercise of the normal 
competences which it derives from international law".102 Philip C. Jessup, who denounced 
the anomaly of an intervention pact for which there were no precedents,103 also stressed 
the customary status of the Spanish Republic’s right to maintain its normal commercial 
relations unchanged. Jessup highlighted that the Pan American Convention on the Duties 
and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife,104 signed in Havana in 1928, had codified 
this entitlement in the Americas and pointed out that “the Arms Traffic Convention of 
1925, if it had come into force, would have served somewhat the same purpose”.105 The 
Resolution of the Institut de droit International on 'Duties of Foreign Powers toward the 
Government which is fighting the Insurrection' had already made it plain in 1900 that 
‘every third Power, at peace with an independent nation, is bound” (…) “not to furnish to 
the insurgents either arms, munitions, military goods, or financial aid” and “not to 
interfere with the measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal 
peace”.106 The fact that the US State Department could not enforce its policy of “moral 
embargo” towards the Republican government against private parties in 1936 further 
illustrates the fact that the Republican government’s consuetudinary expectations were 
anomalously quashed in the summer of 1936.  
Another group of authors, which included the cream of British international lawyers, 
attempted, by contrast, to carve out the view that the non-intervention system was in 
accordance with traditional rules or, as Charles Rousseau noted, that “it is neither legal 
nor illegal, since it develops in a zone of competence which remains, in many respects, a 
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sort of legal no man’s land.”107 For British international lawyers, in particular, the non-
intervention in Spain was but a collective application of a rigorous version of the 
traditional doctrine of neutrality. Indeed, this was the departure point of H.A. Smith’s 
contribution to the British Yearbook of International Law in 1937.108 Smith, who was a 
professor of International law at the London School of Economics, assimilated the non-
intervention agreement to a “collective declaration of neutrality, although presented in 
an unusual form”.109 However, Smith took issue, as will be examined, with the technical 
deviations from the resulting international legal scheme that the subsequent British 
policy of non-recognition of belligerent rights to the parties brought with it. This technical 
deviation alone impelled him to cast a shadow over the justificatory enterprise: “my hope 
is that future lawyers will be able to regard the policy pursued in this war as an anomaly. 
My fear is that future politicians will regard it as a precedent”.110 H.A. Smith also far-
sightedly invoked the figure of the “historian of the future”, noting that he “will be better 
able than we are to appreciate the value of the causes which have led to a departure 
from these rules (the accepted rules which govern the attitude of foreign powers in the 
event of a civil war) in the case of the Spanish Civil War”.111 In 1975, after almost forty 
years of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, a young A. Cassesse agreed with the common 
point of departure of the British justificatory perspective by noting that “the behaviour 
of the States parties to the non-intervention agreements was impeccable from a legal 
point of view”.112 According to Cassesse: “customary international law merely confers a 
right on States to help the lawful Government. States are therefore at liberty to waive 
this right by mutual agreement. Moreover, by agreeing not to help the rebels, they 
merely confirmed an obligation deriving from customary law”.113 Needless to say, by the 
time of the signature of this legally “impeccable” non-intervention agreement, respect 
for the customary legal obligation to not help the rebels was already being blatantly 
breached by Germany and Italy. The German and Italian foreign military intervention 
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continued to escalate throughout the war. If there was a line to be drawn between the 
right of some states to promote a collective arms embargo outside the framework of the 
League of Nations against the Spanish Republic in defiance of the obligation that “every 
third power, at peace with an independent nation” had to not interfere “with the 
measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal peace”,114 such a line 
appeared completely blurred in the apologetic contribution penned in 1937 by the first 
British Judge and President of the International Court of Justice (1946-1955), Arnold D. 
McNair. 115Writing for the Law Quarterly Review in 1937, at the time of his transition from 
the Whewell Professorship of International Law at Cambridge to the post of Vice-
Chancellor of Liverpool University, McNair instead presented an unflinching defence of 
the strategic course of action adopted by the British government regarding the Spanish 
Civil War. McNair, who focused his contribution “on the law applying between each of 
the contending parties and foreign States”,116  began his article by providing arguments 
to justify the British policy of denying any assistance to the Spanish Republican 
government in dealing with General Franco´s uprising. McNair considered that the duty 
of the United Kingdom as a foreign power in peace with Spain “to not interfere with the 
measures which this nation takes for the re-establishing of internal peace” was equivalent 
to the guiding principle that “the conduct of foreign States towards their unhappy 
neighbour suffering from civil strife is merely a continuance of the normal duty of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of another State.”117 Moreover, he argued that he 
was “not aware of any rule of customary international law which imposes any duty upon 
the United Kingdom to sell implements of warfare to the Spanish Government to enable 
it to suppress an insurrection or to permit British or foreign traders in the United Kingdom 
to do so”.118 Having discarded any customary basis “for any active duty to assist” the 
democratic Republican government, McNair then went on to review the treaty law in 
vigour between Spain and Great Britain, in particular the British-Spanish Commercial 
Treaty of 31 October 1922 and the Exchange of Notes dated 4 and 5 April 1927. He put 
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stress on the bilateral agreements in order to argue against the view expressed “in some 
quarters, that we have broken them by not allowing implements of war to be sold to the 
Spanish Government, or at any rate that we have evaded them by improperly resorting 
to an exception contained in them”.119 McNair reaffirmed the exception the British 
government used to evade the applicability of the Commercial Treaty (including 
“weapons, ammunition and war material and, under exceptional circumstances, also in 
respect of other materials needed in war”) in vigour between Spain and the United 
Kingdom “to protect itself from being depleted of war materials.” McNair, who 
maintained that “there cannot be any doubt that the United Kingdom was and is legally 
justified in prohibiting the export to Spain of these materials, as it did as from August 19 
1936, either because we could not spare these materials or for any other reason”120 and 
went even further. He invoked the “maintenance of the peace in Europe” as a legal 
ground “by virtue of a condition to be implied in the treaty to issue such a prohibition”. 
121  
However, the persuasive attempt by McNair – who later became the First President of 
the European Court of Human Rights (1956-1965) – to justify the international legal 
“impeccability” of the British policy in the event of the military coup d’état in the summer 
of 1936 in a member state of the League of Nations with a secular multi-party democratic 
system based on equal rights for all citizens, with provisions for regional autonomy and 
with the right to universal – including, for the first time in Spanish history, female – 
suffrage,122 had to confront a number of further technical difficulties. The first of these 
had to do with the use of the term neutrality, and the second one with the question of 
the implicit triggering of belligerent rights to the contending parties by the non-
intervention agreement as well as with the consequences of the early recognition by 
Germany and Italy of Franco’s government as the de iure government of Spain. Third, the 
British de facto recognition of the fact of insurgency also triggered further legal 
difficulties. 
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Indeed, as Berman notes, the first difficulty for McNair had to do with the “misuse” of the 
term “neutrality”, or at the very least the anomalous enlargement to which it had to be 
subjected at the time for it to be able to indicate that the non-intervention system could 
(then) be seen as the application of a stringent version of the duties of neutrals.”123 The 
issue of neutrality considerably coloured the American contributors’ approach to the first 
stage of the international legal debate on the Spanish Civil War. P.C. Jessup remarked on 
the US Acting Secretary of State’s reticence to use neutrality terminology in a circular 
instruction of August 7 1936 that “it is clear that our Neutrality Law with respect to 
embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war has no application in the present 
situation, since that applies only in the event of war between or among nations”.124 
Another US scholar, N.P. Padeldorf, also highlighted that “neutrality and non-intervention 
in times of unrecognized insurgency and in times of international warfare involve very 
different propositions. To apply to unrecognized and irresponsible rebels the same 
principles that are applicable to sovereign states and established governments is to 
encourage rebellion and disorder and to weaken public law and authority. The law cannot 
long afford to do this”.125  
The legitimate expectations of the Republican government to be able to arm itself to curb 
an internal insurrection are further illustrated by the fact that in December 1936 at the 
request of a US private exporter the US Department of State issued two licenses126 for 
the “exportation of a shipment of airplanes and engines to the port of Bilbao in Spain, 
which is the principal port of entry held by the forces of the Spanish Government.”127 The 
US government sent a telegram to a series of European governments to justify its legal 
obligation in view of the fact that this private party had not “patriotically refrained from 
requesting licenses for such shipments upon receiving an explanation of this 
Government's attitude and policy of scrupulous non-intervention in the Spanish 
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situation”.128  The private exporter instead, insisted “upon his legal right” to have such 
licences granted because, as the telegram from the US government readily admitted, the 
US Neutrality Law “providing for an embargo against the shipment of arms, ammunition 
and implements of war to "belligerent countries" does not apply to the present civil strife 
in Spain as it is applicable to wars between nations”.129 
Many authors engaged with a second, related, difficulty of the justificatory scheme. This 
resulted from the fact that the non-intervention agreement implicitly recognized the 
existence of a war between the parties, and it therefore implicitly entailed the recognition 
of belligerent rights to the rebels.130 Writing in 1937, G. Balladore Pallieri,131 also a later 
President of the European Human Rights Commission (1974 - 1980), highlighted that “if 
one did not interpret the states participating in the non-intervention system as having 
implicitly recognized a state of belligerency, the system would be illegal because it would 
have disabled "a State at peace seeking to vanquish a revolt."132 A. Smith too, who, as we 
saw, initially assimilated the non-intervention agreement to a “collective declaration of 
neutrality, although presented in an unusual form,”133 made the recognition of 
belligerence a post-facto pre-condition of the international legality of the non-
intervention agreement itself: “if the powers concerned did not recognize the existence 
of a war, then the Non-Intervention Agreement was singularly misnamed. If the rebellion 
was no more than an internal disorder, then the agreement was a grave act of 
intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, for it was an attempt to prevent the Spanish 
Government from obtaining the supplies which it needed for the restoration of order in 
its own dominions”.134   
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Remarkably enough in this context, however, the British Foreign Office, which had 
orchestrated the non-intervention agreement, decided to have it both ways by resisting 
the recognition of belligerent rights to the contending parties.135 Against this background, 
H.A. Smith’s position was, therefore, that of a plea for international legal coherence with 
familiar established categories by recognising belligerence and belligerent rights.136  As 
early as 1937, H.A. Smith stressed the double standards of the British Foreign Office, 
which had “recognized the authority of the insurgent government throughout the 
territories which the latter controls”, and highlighted that “belligerent recognition is a 
matter of conduct and not of words”.137  
The nominal British policy of non-recognition of a belligerent status of the parties, and on 
the bandwagon of this the non-recognition of belligerence by other states led A. Cassese 
to retrospectively consider that the Spanish Civil War “was, rather, regarded as a conflict 
belonging to a tertium genus, intermediate between mere ‘civil wars’ and those civil wars 
where the contending parties are recognized as belligerents”.138 However, Cassesse’s 
retrospective perspective, which he reached on the basis that “the behaviour of third 
States towards the contending parties in Spain never amounted to a recognition of 
belligerency”139 must, however, be qualified in the light of the fact the several states went 
far beyond recognizing the belligerent status of Franco´s camp during the Spanish Civil 
War. Indeed, as early as November 18 1936, barely two months after the establishment 
under the aegis of the British Foreign Office of the Non-Intervention Committee in 
London, Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany already granted de iure official recognition 
to Franco’s government as the established government of Spain. In doing so, Germany 
and Italy were completely reversing the international legal status of the leaders of the 
forces who in orchestrating a military coup d’etat had committed a crime of rebellion 
against the high organs of the Spanish nation and the democratically elected Republican 
government. The Republican government reacted to this recognition de iure of the anti-
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Republican forces by denouncing a “foreign intervention” under article 11 before the 
League of Nations in November 1936.  
Jessup agreed with the position of the Republican government, highlighting that 
“international law does brand as an illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of another 
state a recognition prematurely accorded to an insurrectionary group with a view to 
aiding that group in ousting the established government”.140 Moreover, on the 8th of 
June 1937, the insurgents’ camp issued a diplomatic note claiming that Franco’s 
Salamanca government had already been recognized by six countries: Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Albania, Germany and Italy. These were followed in 1937 by both 
Japan and the Holy See, and by many others in 1938 either de iure (such as Portugal, 
Turkey, Austria and Hungary) or de facto (such as Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland)141 through the establishment of diplomatic relationships in the last months 
of 1938. The recognition by Germany and Italy in 1936 of the nationalist army, “not 
provisionally as belligerents, but as the permanent and legitimate government of 
Spain”142 is reflected in the writings of British international lawyers. McNair, whose legal 
analysis appears, as we have seen, to strikingly coincide with the course of the policy 
decisions adopted by the British Foreign Office regarding the Spanish Civil War, devoted 
considerable attention to the question of whether there was what he termed “a tertium 
quid between a state of peace and Recognition of Belligerency.”143 McNair agreed with 
Jessup´s view about the illegality of the German and Italian recognition of Franco’s camp: 
“there is no doubt that recognition of legitimacy at that stage of the conflict constituted 
an illegal intervention and an international wrong upon Spain”144 However, Mc Nair went 
further by  highlighting that the de iure recognition of Franco´s government by Italy and 
Germany in November 1936 amounted to an implicit recognition of belligerence and that, 
therefore, Italian and German military interventions, in breach of the law of neutrality, 
“against the Spanish Government amounted to acts of war against Spain”.145 This derived 
from Article 7 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on “the 
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Consequences of the Grant of Recognition of Belligerency by another State”, according 
to which, as echoed by McNair, “recognition entails all the usual consequences of 
neutrality”, or in other words, “it automatically brings into force as between each 
belligerent party and the recognizing State the corpus of the law of neutrality”.146 
However, the admission that Germany and Italy had engaged in a war of aggression 
against Spain, as the Republican government declared before the League of Nations in 
late 1936, did not (paradoxically enough) lead Mc Nair to conclude that the anomalous 
international non-intervention agreement heralded by the United Kingdom and France, 
to which Germany and Italy were parties, was moot. Neither did it lead McNair to advise 
the recognition of belligerent rights to the contending parties. By contrast, McNair, 
whose decision not to engage with the work of other authors147 – including that of Smith 
– reinforces the impression that he might acted as a shadow legal advisor to the British 
Foreign Office, denied that the UK actions should be interpreted as constituting a de facto 
recognition of belligerent rights of the contending parties. Instead, Mc Nair continued to 
focus on justifying the original British policy on the grounds that “I cannot see that there 
is any well-settled practice which fetters the discretion of the United Kingdom in deciding 
whether or not it is politic to grant or to deny recognition of belligerency”.148 Instead, he 
insisted on the stated practice according to which “our Ministers have frequently 
repeated that we have granted belligerent rights to neither side”149 and decided to focus 
on how the non-recognition of belligerence specifically affected the UK “with special 
reference to a maritime power like ourselves”.150 McNair again showed again his ability 
to excel in the lawyer-like practice of argumentative reversion by highlighting the non-
applicability of the rules of belligerence, and in particular those which may affect a 
maritime power like the UK, such as those that confer “upon both belligerent parties the 
right of visit and search of the merchant ships of the recognizing State, the right of 
                                                          
146 Ibid. 
147 McNair, at 500. “I do not wish to be thought to be lacking in courtesy because I have not dealt with the 
literature now growing up round the subject of this article, notably Professor Smith's article in the British 
Year Book of International Law of this year and articles and comments in the American Journal of 
International Law. I have only refrained because I wanted to state my own view upon the materials available 
to me, and my article is already long enough. 
148 Ibid., at 484. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., at 476.  
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “In the General Interest of Peace “- British International Lawyers and the Spanish 
Civil War 17 Journal of the History of International Law (2015, Forthcoming) © 
29 
 
intercepting contraband, the right of establishing blockades, and the right of setting up 
Prize Courts and condemning merchant ships for carriage of contraband, breach of 
blockade, un-neutral service etc.”.151  
McNair’s contribution to study of the law relating to the civil war in Spain concludes with 
him characterizing the legal regime adopted by the UK as one in which “we were 
compelled by the exigencies of the situation to recognize the fact of insurgency in Spain 
and thus to embark upon the comparatively uncharted sea of a relationship to both 
parties of which the rules are ill-defined and still in course of development.”152 A number 
of states followed the UK into the “unchartered sea” and “adopted the intermediate legal 
institution of recognition of insurgency.”153 According to another leading British-
assimilated international lawyer, H. Lauterpacht, “the condition of insurgency in 
international law is one of considerable elasticity. It is a factual relation in the meaning 
that legal rights and duties as between insurgents and third states exist only in so far as 
they are expressly conceded and agreed upon for reasons of convenience, of humanity, 
or of economic interests”154 
This is the legal position on the basis of which the British government developed greater 
ties with Franco’s Salamanca government from the last third of 1937. This 
rapprochement, which included the signature of commercial agreements, led to the 
exchange of diplomatic agents – headed by the Duke of Alba in London from 16th 
November 1937.155 This gradual rapprochement, which coincided with a parallel British 
rapprochement to Italy, led to a change in the British position. The “recognition of the 
government of General Franco as an insurgent government exercising de facto control 
over a considerable portion of Spain”156 influenced the legal position adopted by the 
British courts in a number of cases in 1938 and 1939.   
                                                          
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid,, at 498  
153 De Zayas, op.cit. 4  
154 Hersch Lauterpacht, “Recognition of Insurgents as a de Facto Government” Modern Law Review 3 (1939) 
pp. 1-19,  3 
155 See e.g. Berdah op.cit., 228.  See comparatively on the evolution of French foreign policy regarding 
recognition of Franco’s camp in 1938, see e.g. Michel Catala, “L'attitude de la France face à la Guerre 
d'Espagne: l'échec des négociations pour la reconnaissance du gouvernement franquiste en 1938” 
Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 29 (1993) 243-262. 
156 Lauterpacht op.cit, 8 quoting a communication from the British Foreign Office to the Court of Appeals 
in the case Banco de Bilbao v Rey (1938)  
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “In the General Interest of Peace “- British International Lawyers and the Spanish 
Civil War 17 Journal of the History of International Law (2015, Forthcoming) © 
30 
 
4. H. Lauterpacht and the Practitioner’s Approach to the Spanish Civil War  
The literature on the Spanish Civil War, “which abounded in anomalous situations”,157 
adopted a new character in 1938, the year Europe witnessed the Anschluss of Austria in 
March 1938 and the Munich Agreement, which in September 1938 permitted the 
German annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, authors 
devoting their attention to the Spanish Civil War gradually abandoned the areas of non-
intervention and the recognition of belligerency to give way to a focus on a number of 
other interrelated questions raised by the conduct of the hostilities. In the French 
language, Louis Le Fur, an ardent Catholic conservative and defender of natural law,158 
who heartily supported the legitimacy of Franco’s cause and, by extension, the legality of 
the non-intervention agreement, was among those who had already included aspects 
related to maritime warfare in their analysis back in 1936 and 1937.159 From early 1938, 
a number of contributions in the English language also began to tackle the legal anomalies 
arising from the non-application of the regime of maritime neutrality to issues of 
maritime warfare.160 These legal peculiarities included discussions on matters such as the 
reconceptualization of the terminology of piracy in the light of blockade actions and 
submarine warfare161 carried out principally by Italy. J.L. Brierly, who held the Chichele 
Professorship of International Law at Oxford at the time, briefly dealt with the debates 
surrounding the Spanish Civil War in a short intervention broadcast in 1938. Brierly was 
mainly worried by the bombing of British ships162 in Spanish ports and puzzled over the 
effects of the absence of a formal recognition of belligerence on the jurisdiction of prize 
courts, the rights of the parties in conflict to conduct searches to identify contraband 
goods, and the right of seizure. He identified the danger of war in Europe as “the invisible 
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part of the iceberg”163 lurking beneath the anomalous status quo in Spain. Air strikes by 
officially non-intervening powers on the civil population also attracted wide doctrinal 
attention among international lawyers following the destruction of the town of Guernica 
by the German Condor Legion in April 1937 and the indiscriminate massive Italian 
bombardments of Barcelona on March 1938.164  
The conduct of hostilities brought one case before the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and numerous other cases to the attention of different national courts.165 
Belgium’s signing of the non-intervention agreement did not prevent it from invoking the 
international responsibility166 of the Republican government after the death of the 
Belgian ambassador Baron Jaques de Borchgrave in Madrid. However, the PCIJ never 
rendered a judgement on the Borchgrave case because the proceedings were eventually 
discontinued at the request of the parties. The Spanish Republican government, stressing 
the exceptional circumstances of a Madrid under siege, presented its excuses, and the 
Belgian government recognised that, given the lack of proof of any engagement of a 
governmental agent in the act, the responsibility of the Spanish government had not been 
compromised.167 As for domestic courts, British ones in particular focused on a series of 
cases involving “measures of expropriation and requisition enacted during the Spanish 
conflict by both the Republican and the Nationalist Governments”.168 These measures of 
requisition involved “fundamental questions relating to state immunity, the effect of the 
acts of foreign states and governments, and the consequences of de facto recognition by 
the British government169 of Franco’s “insurgence”. 
Hersch Lauterpacht, in his only direct contribution to the study of the Spanish Civil War, 
examined the matter of “the recognition of insurgents as a government” in the light of 
what he considered to be “perhaps the most significant case decided by English Courts 
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during the Spanish Civil War, namely, Arantzadu Mendi”.170The House of Lords, in the 
case of the Government of Republic of Spain v SS Arantzazu Mendi and Others, on 23rd 
February 1939 confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal which had found that the 
insurgent nationalist government had the status of the government of a foreign sovereign 
state.171 Against the background of this de iure judicial recognition of Franco’s Burgos 
government (which was also the position of Hitler’s Germany from 18th November 1936, 
and later that of Italy), H. Lauterpacht critically examined whether “the nature and degree 
of recognition stated in the (earlier) answer of the foreign office irresistibly led to the 
conclusion arrived at by the British courts”.172 Lauterpacht opposed this conclusion of the 
House of Lords on the basis of the need to differentiate between the right of a state to 
“recognize the insurgents as a government exercising de facto authority over the territory 
under its control”, which, being the British position, was, in Lauterpacht’s view, “not 
contrary to international law”, and the fact, as he stressed, that “such recognition is 
limited in its effects and cannot properly be assimilated to recognition de iure”.173 For 
Lauterpacht, the distinction derived from what he considered “the established principle 
that so long as the civil war lasts the recognition of the insurgents, whether recognized 
as belligerents or not, as a de iure government is contrary to international law”.174 Until 
that moment arrived,  Lauterpacht was of the view contra the interpretation adopted by 
the British courts (on the basis of their interpretation of the answer they received from 
the British Foreign Office) that recognition of the insurgent government “while obliging 
courts to acknowledge the validity of the legislation of the de facto insurgent authority 
within its territory, it does not transform the authority thus recognized into an 
independent government of a foreign sovereign state outside its territory to jurisdictional 
immunities, in particular as against the government recognized de iure, in respect of its 
property or its representatives”.175 The neglect of the study of the Spanish Civil War 
among historians of international law may account for the lack of attention by the 
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extensive number of commentators on H. Lauterpacht´s opus176 to the influence of 
Lauterpacht´s doctrinal position in his Recognition in International Law.177 This contrasts 
with the fact, as E. Lauterpacht briefly records in his biography of his father, that 
“although no direct trace has been found of H. Lauterpacht’s views, a letter to him from 
Mr Pilcher QC, leading counsel for the Republican government, suggests that H 
Lauterpacht” (…) “has given him some assistance in the form of a note supportive of the 
view that the nationalist government did not constitute a state and was not entitled to 
immunity”178 in the Arantzazu Mendi case in the English courts.   
Lauterpacht’s contribution to the study of the international legal questions raised by the 
Spanish Civil War remains within the strictest confines of doctrinal work. Lauterpacht is 
supportive of the right to remedy, which the Spanish Republican government as de iure 
government of Spain had been deprived of by the jurisdictional immunity granted by the 
British courts in the light of the judicially sanctioned assimilation of the insurgent de facto 
Franco government to the de iure government of Spain. However, the character of his 
contribution is in perfect consonance with what A. Carty has termed the “practitioner’s 
approach”,179 characteristic of the “greats’ of the discipline in the 1920s and 1930s, in 
particular … Oppenheim, McNair, Brierly and even Lauterpacht”.180 This “practitioner’s 
approach” coincides with what M. Koskenniemi considers to be the common programme 
that Mc Nair and Lauterpacht “shared: to bring international law out of its isolation as a 
branch of suspect moral or jurisprudential theory by presenting it as an object of legal 
technique no different from the domestic”.181  The assertion of the professional relevance 
of international law within the common law tradition appears almost programmatically 
present in a number of works penned by British international lawyers in the 1920s and 
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1930s. Writing in 1928, P. Higgins highlighted “the scarcely veiled contempt with which 
international law was viewed by practising members of the Bar and the legal profession 
in general”. Higgins concluded   that “it was extraordinary that, in a country with so many 
worldwide commitments, so few people were trained in international law" and that it 
was not even considered “an essential qualification” in the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic 
Service or the Service Departments.182 A year later in 1929, partly thanks to the influence 
of H. Lauterpacht, by then a Lecturer in International Law at the London School of 
Economics under the mentorship of A.D. McNair, The Annual Digest of Public 
International Law began to publish a digest of cases in international tribunals, and in 
national tribunals on points of international law.   
Independent academic study of international law in England benefited from the 
establishment of the League of Nations. This engendered a greater academic 
engagement with international law, or, as J.L. Brierly remarked, “a quickening of interest 
in the subject in this country and others”.183 In 1923, the British Yearbook of International 
Law added itself to the pre-war batch of new international law journals which “had 
broken the pattern (if it was such)”184 of earlier nineteenth century journals on 
international law of “not pointing to any national and regional allegiance” in their title.185 
However, the academic appeal of international law in England in the early interwar period 
should be seen in relative terms: as of 1921, there were only 10 public teachers of 
international law in the United Kingdom.186 Admittedly, this was no great force to 
academically manage what has retrospectively been called “the modern foundational 
period of contemporary international law”.187 In the aftermath of the First World War, 
the three most significant developments in international law in the first half of the 20th 
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century began to establish themselves: “the move to international organization in the 
political and other spheres; the development of permanent international courts and of a 
recognizable international judicial technique; and the attempt to control the use of force 
as an instrument of policy in international relations.188 According to Crawford, the reason 
for the lack of a university international law tradition can be found in the nineteenth 
century, when, although “international law was a developed study in the English-speaking 
world” (…) “in England this had relatively little to do with the universities, and it was based 
on no new theoretical underpinnings or insights”. Instead, whereas “international law 
was a developed system of practice for dealing with certain classes of relations beyond 
the state”, (…) its “local focus was the Foreign Office and the embassies and lawyers’ 
chambers in London rather than the universities”.189  
Against this background, Lauterpacht’s generational focus on the importance of judicial 
practice in international law is apparent in a series of his writings in the early 1930s. In 
1931, for instance, he attempted to prove “that there is no substance in the doctrine of 
’two schools of thought‘ “, an Anglo-American and Continental one, in international law 
by taking issue respectively with, first, “differences between the ’two schools of thought‘ 
on specific matters of international law”; second, the question of “Anglo-American and 
continental rules and doctrines of municipal law of possible relevance in international 
law”; and, third, the question of “general differences in legal approach and legal 
philosophy”.190 He concluded that contemporary statements on the alleged contrast 
between Anglo-American and Continental schools of thought in international law “did 
not find support in any of the above meanings of the term”191 and that they should be 
discarded both on the ground of scientific accuracy (because “it is essentially no more 
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than a phrase”192) and because of “the ultimate uniformity of the sense of right and 
justice which is the foundation of the legal ordering of the relations between states”.193  
J.L. Brierly defended the same perspective in his overview of “International Law in 
England” in 1935, stressing that court decisions were “one of the sources of the raw 
materials out of which the international system is constructed”.194 Brierly principally 
focused on a series of areas (namely the law of prize) through which decisions of the 
English Courts had contributed to the development of international law.  Like 
Lauterpacht, Brierly also considered British judicial practice “an important source, both 
because of the weight which the views of a great country properly carry in international 
affairs, and particularly because of the high prestige of our Courts”.195 However, despite 
acknowledging the progress that the study of international law in England had 
experienced during the interwar period, Brierly held that “international law would be 
stronger, and those who are especially concerned with its study would be encouraged, if 
the interest of English lawyers in it were more widespread than it yet is.”196 This common 
perception among the reduced group of interwar British international lawyers of a 
comparative professional irrelevance of international law in the highly court-ridden 
British legal system197 also transpires from the rather gloomy picture that W.E. Beckett 
offered in 1939 of “the position in England of international law as a subject of scientific 
study and practice”.198 Beckett, who served as the “Second Legal Adviser” to the Legal 
Department of the Foreign Office, was involved in Spanish affairs during the conflict, 
along with Gerald Fitzmaurice, who by then was “Third Legal Adviser”, and his former 
professor in Cambridge, A.D. McNair, also a future British judge at the International Court 
of Justice (1960-1973) and the European Court of Human Rights.199 According to Beckett, 
who was also a member of the Advisory Committee of the Annual Digest of Public 
International Law Cases, the situation in England was still one of “little general interest 
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in, and much general ignorance of, international law – public and private”. Beckett noted 
that these “two factors, indifference and ignorance, operate in a vicious progression, one 
producing increased states of the other”.200 
In coherence with this doctrinal background, Lauterpacht’s only contribution to the 
debate on the Spanish Civil War focused on the practice of domestic tribunals regarding 
the conflict. Lauterpacht, who in 1937 had replaced A.D. McNair as Whewell professor of 
International law at Cambridge, and would go on to replace him again as British judge on 
the bench of the International Court of Justice from 1955 to 1960, was solely interested 
in disputing the precedential “authority” of the Arantzazu Mendi case because of its 
finding that there is no distinction between de facto and de iure recognition before British 
Courts. The only deferential contextual reference to the horrifying events behind 
Lauterpacht’s parochial technical dissection of the case – a legal dissection that never put 
into question either the legality or the opportuneness of the non-intervention in Spain 
agreement – was a sweeping reference to the Spanish Civil War as “a period when 
breaches of international law on a wide scale were committed by some states and 
tolerated by others in what was assumed to be the general interest of peace”.201  
5. Conclusion – The Secret Life of International Law 
Contemporary historians cannot argue, as S.G. Payne did back in 1962, that “work on the 
Spanish Civil War has not yet reached any sort of climax, for serious investigation has just 
begun”.202 Greatly to the contrary, generations of historians, with British hispanistas at 
the forefront of the research, have felt a contagious fascination with the Spanish Civil 
War. It is to a considerable extent due to British historiography that, notably since the 
late 70s and early 80s203 the British foreign policy regarding the Spanish Civil War has 
been presented “as cynical, callous and objectively pro-Franco”204 in its enabling of what 
E. Moradiellos called an “asymmetrical structure of international support and 
                                                          
200 Beckett, op.cit. 258 
201 Lauterpacht (1939) op.cit.,1.   
202 Stanley G. Payne, “Recent Studies on the Spanish Civil War” The Journal of Modern History 34, No. 3 ( 
1962), 312, 312.  
203 Seminally on the basis of those archives, Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 
1936-1939, MacMillan Press, London (1979) 
204  Tom Buchanan, “Edge of Darkness: British 'Front-Line' Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1937”  
 Contemporary European History 12  (2003) 279-303, 279 
Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, “In the General Interest of Peace “- British International Lawyers and the Spanish 
Civil War 17 Journal of the History of International Law (2015, Forthcoming) © 
38 
 
inhibition”205 favourable to the insurgents. Today, the case for British Macchiavellism 
regarding the Spanish Civil War dominates the perspective of those historians of the 
“future” once invoked by H. A. Smith.  
The conclusions of modern historical research on the Spanish Civil War do not contradict 
the view that the British-led policy of localization of the conflict through non-intervention 
and an arms embargo was indeed seen by many contemporaries as a remedy to avoid 
the extension of the war to the rest of Europe in the summer of 1936. This danger of 
escalation was surely present in Leon Blum´s change of mind from 21 July 1936 – when 
he was determined to send support to the Republicans  in Spain – 27 July – when, after a 
two-day trip to London, he provisionally halted the decision to send arms to Spain – to 8 
August 1936 – when France proposed the Non-Intervention Pact.206 Although early 
commentators such as N. Padeldorf made it plain that “it has never been and it cannot 
be successfully demonstrated that there would have been general European intervention 
in Spain had there been no accord”,207 it is indisputable that the danger of escalation was 
a major argument in the decisions of many European countries and the United States to 
stick to the anomalous non-intervention agreement sponsored by Britain and France and 
to a series of international legal positions which, according to N. Berman, “could be 
viewed as the "nadir" of the traditional rules”.208Neither is it disputed that what lay 
behind these anomalous international legal positions was a British foreign policy of 
appeasement under the conservative governments of S. Baldwin (June 1935 to May 
1937) and N. Chamberlain (May 1937 to May 1940). This was a policy that a successor of 
A.D. McNair at the Presidency of the International Court of Justice, Judge S.M. Schwebel, 
later decried as “legally infirm (in the context of the obligations of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations) as it was politically cynical and craven”.209 
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The present interdisciplinary study has, however, made it sufficiently clear that an early 
version of N. Chamberlain´s “peace for  our time” speech210 , at the price of the sacrifice 
of Spain, was not the only – or even the main – factor behind British foreign policy-making 
regarding non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War. In other words, this study has shown 
is that what lay behind the British policy of appeasement of Germany and Italy was not 
only – to borrow from Lauterpacht´s laconic remark – “the general interest of peace”.211 
In fact, to geostrategic concerns – including the protection of the Mediterranean 
“imperial route” through the Strait of Gibraltar – and British long-term economic 
interests212 (40% of foreign investment in Spain was British in 1936),213 one should add 
religious concerns and the anti-Bolshevism214 of the British establishment elite.215 The 
anti-communist element of British policy, which was fuelled by early reports to the 
Foreign Office from pro-Franco British diplomats in Spain,216 remained an important 
factor in Britain’s determination to prevent “France by hook or by crook from going 
“Bolshevik” under the influence of the Spanish Civil War”.217 This class-background 
motivation was stressed by D. Little, who noted that “Britain quickly adopted a 'better 
Franco than Stalin' approach, which probably helped shape the strategy of appeasement 
over the following two years. Given disturbing signs from Madrid to Athens of a new wave 
of Soviet subversion in early 1936, by August Whitehall clearly believed that Republican 
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Spain was better dead than red”.218 As Graham noted, this background demonstrates that 
the Spanish Civil War “held up a mirror to class tensions and imperialist rivalries in 
Europe”,219 and lends credibility to the “basic coincidence between the objectives of 
British foreign policy and the diplomatic aims of the rebel authorities”.220 
Historical research in the archives of the British Foreign Office has amply demonstrated 
that the Non-Intervention Agreement and the establishment of a supervisory committee 
in London served the principal British diplomatic objectives in the conflict well as it 
entailed “restriction of the war to Spain, restraining the intervention of her French ally, 
avoiding any alignment with the Soviet Union, and any confrontation with Italy and 
Germany over their support for the rebels”.221 The basic coincidence between these 
British foreign policy goals and the insurgents’ strategy clearly appears from the archives 
of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Franco in 1939:  
“Our principal and almost exclusive task had to be to localize the war in Spanish territory, 
avoiding in this way by all means an international war out of which we would have little 
to gain and much to lose. At the same time, however, we had to ensure that we would 
still be able to obtain the aid we needed from our foreign friends while ensuring at all 
costs that our enemy received no aid or at least that this aid was minimized”.222  
This coincidence of interests appears confirmed by (Sir) Robert Vansittart, Chief 
Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Office, for whom, writing in a memo in 1939 (but only 
made public in the 1970s) “the whole course of our policy of non-intervention – which 
has effectively, as we know, worked in an entirely one-sided manner – has been putting 
a premium on Franco´s victory”.223 
The British government’s covert pro-Francoism, expressed in a non-intervention strategy 
which some did not hesitate early on to term a policy of British “malevolent neutrality”,224 
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had the effect of tilting the balance against the Second Spanish Republic. Support for the 
non-intervention agreement de facto neutralized the role of the League of Nations vis à 
vis the early German and Italian interventions in the conflict, and amounted to the earlier 
imperial guardian of the system of collective security and preventing many third countries 
from legally assisting the incumbent Republican government. In this process, British 
international lawyers served as handmaidens to the strategic design of the British Foreign 
Office at a time when – according to Crawford – international law provided “part of the 
language in which international debates were conducted, the conduct of politicians 
criticized, proposals for settlement or change put forward and rejected or agreed”.225 The 
non-intervention agreement marked the death knell of the system of collective security 
established by the League of Nations, and became the revolving door for Europe’s entry 
into the Second World War. The real lasting legacy of the Spanish Civil War for the history 
of international law and civil wars is that it provides a cautionary tale about the role of 
international lawyers, who work as a two-way bridge between international policymaking 
and international law,226under the “gravitational or other effects” of those “black 
holes”227 to which the repercussions of the “secret life of international law” on the 
“visible life of international law”228 have been aptly compared.  
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